


Limiting the Influence of Low Quality Information in Community Sensing



Introduction

A big issue in community sensing is that malicious agents can insert false information. This is usually addressed using reputation systems that estimate the credibility and punish misinformation. We present a novel reputation system that for the first time allows to bound the negative impact that malicious sensors can have on the learned outcome.

The Setting



The sensing scenario with *online information fusion*:

- Initially, the center has prior information about air pollution over an urban area.
- Crowd-sensors report their measurements sequentially. Each report Y is merged with the current pollution map P using pollution model M .
- When trusted sensor reports X_t , the center can evaluate the reports of crowd-sensors using a scoring function S . This corresponds to one period of sensing t .
- The crowd sensing process then continues in the same manner until the period $t = T$, which is called *sensing time*.

Goal: Limit the overall negative influence that a sensor can have on the fused result.

Our Approach: Track the quality of reported information using a reputation system and discard information coming from sensors with low reputations. Reward a sensor based on its marginal contributions.

Inefficiency Measures

Expected myopic impact – measures the influence of a sensors:

$$\Delta_s = \sum_{t=1}^T \Delta_{s,t} = \sum_{t=1}^T \Pr(\text{update}) \cdot [S(P_{s,t}^{\text{new}}, X_t) - S(P_{s,t}^{\text{old}}, X_t)]$$

Expected information loss – measures the amount of discarded information from non-malicious sensors:

$$IL_s = \sum_{t=1}^T (1 - \Pr(\text{update})) \cdot [S(P_{s,t}^{\text{new}}, X_t) - S(P_{s,t}^{\text{old}}, X_t)]$$

Related Work

- The influence limiter: Provably manipulation-resistant recommender system*, P. Resnick and R. Sami, 2007.
- A robust reputation system for mobile ad-hoc networks*, S. Buchegger and J.-Y. L. Boudec, 2003.
- The beta reputation system*, A. Josang and R. Ismail, 2002.

CS Influence Limiter (CSIL)

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for t = 1 to t = T do:
  foreach Sensor s do:
     $P_{s,t}^{\text{old}} = P$ ;
     $P_{s,t}^{\text{new}} = \text{Update}(P, Y_{s,t})$ ;
    if rand(0, 1) <  $\rho_{s,t} / (\rho_{s,t} + 1)$  then:
       $P = P_{s,t}^{\text{new}}$ ;
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When X_t is received:

$$\text{score}_{s,t} = S(P_{s,t}^{\text{new}}, X_t) - S(P_{s,t}^{\text{old}}, X_t);$$
$$\rho_{s,t} = \rho_{s,t} * (1 + 0.5 * \text{score}_{s,t});$$

Information fusion: stochastic and reputation dependent

Reputation update: exponential increase/decrease of reputations

Properties

Theorem 1: (Query Complexity) The number of queries to a black box model M of the CSIL algorithm in one time period t is $O(n)$, where n is the number of reported values.

Theorem 2: (Limited Damage) The expected total myopic impact of sensor s is in the CSIL algorithm bounded from below by $\Delta_s > 2\rho_0$, where ρ_0 is the initial reputation of sensor s .

Theorem 3: (Bounded Information Loss) Informally, the expected information loss of the CSIL algorithm for potentially discarding the reports of an accurate sensor is bounded from above by a constant.

Theorem 4: (Informed Reporting) If a sensor s maximizes its expected score, then it also maximizes its expected impact.

Experimental Analysis

Baseline: Beta reputation system with trustworthiness determined by a fixed threshold.

Sensors: 25% honest; 75% malicious - 4 different misreporting strategies.

Quality measure: Average regret (over time) for not knowing which sensors are honest (the lower, the better).

Results: CSIL outperforms the baseline and satisfies the no-regret property.

